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STEP 1: THE MEANS OF REASON
In this paper, a rational God is defined as being constructed with two components:
a mode of reason, and a certain exoteric religion. Firstly, with regard to the former,
within the confines of reason or the intellect, there are several intellectual or rational or
more broadly speaking plenty of rational modes or ways, including when it comes to
familiarizing oneself with God. This involves idea, concept, grasping, state of mind,
phenomena, and other modes where the mind consciously and intellectually discerns.
This thesis will primarily address God through the rational mode of conception, or
concept. Note that this selection amongst modes of reason is completely arbitrary.
Secondly, with regard to the latter, within the confines of religious traditions, there is
even more diversity than there is regarding modes of reason, again including and this
time especially when it comes to familiarizing oneself with God. But for the definition of
exoteric itself, it more so has to do with the beliefs and practices, the rituals and the
stories—the culture, so to speak—of a certain religion, such that without the specifically
religious culture the religion would lack an exoteric component and would not technically
be a religion. For the purposes of this thesis, a Judeo-Christian God has been selected as
the religious lens through which an examination will be conducted. This selection is not
arbitrary at all: such a religious lens when it comes to God has an outstanding
prominence in the world. Therefore, with regard to the means of reason, God’s
familiarization via a Judeo-Christian concept of God will be addressed.
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The Concept of God Proper
To understand God just as a concept, the nature of concepts must be understood
first. After close examination it is realized that concepts are finite: take the example of an
apple. How does one know that an apple is an apple? There are several qualities one
could list. One could say that it is red, or green; that it is round, that the inside is fairly
solid and white; that is it a fruit, etc. All of the qualities of an apple make an apple
discernable. Now, take the example of an orange: instead of the inside being white, it is
orange; and instead of the outside being green or red, it is also orange; the inside is not
solid but it is rather squishy. Clearly, apples and orange are not the same thing. But could
they ever be?
The only way for an apple and an orange to be the same would be for their
abovementioned qualities to have no difference between each other— and this is surely
not the case. Redness and orangeness are not at all the same thing; likewise, solidness and
squishiness are not the same thing either. Moreover, orangeness can never become
redness or the reverse because they are determined to always be as they are. Looking at
this distinction, it seems that what keeps qualities distinct from each other is contained in
their very nature. Qualities contain finitude—they have conceptual borders which make
them discernable and distinct. If they did not, it would be entirely possible that
orangeness could become redness and that an apple could eventually become an orange,
for without their finitude, one would be unable to know the difference between the two.
In this way, concepts, including the concept of God, are necessarily distinct from
one another, much like Descartes claims that all knowledge is clear and distinct
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(Newman). Moreover, since it has been established that qualities are necessarily finite—
where some end, others begin—one can now even say that if concepts did not have
finitude, one would virtually have no discernable knowledge of the world. This is to say
that concepts are separate from each other, that they are bordered. It is in this way that
one can see how the concept of God is finite.
The Concept of God as Omni-Qualified
Among being defined in other ways, in Judeo-Christian religion, God is defined
primarily by four attributes: omnipotence, omnibenevolence, omniscience, and
omnipresence. These are God’s “omni-attributes”; they are discussed just as much as
their definitions are debated (Quinn, 229-286). And, since omni means all, they mean that
God is all powerful, all good, all knowing, and all present.
The Concept of God as Immaterial
In Judeo-Christian religion, God is immaterial (Quinn, 271). In the Old and New
Testament, however, God is discussed physically. For instance, God is discussed as
having an “outstretched arm” (JPS Tanakh, Exodus 6: 6) when He lead the Jews out of
Egypt. Moreover, God interacts with the physical world, such as parting the red sea, or
having a son with a body. This may seem to cause trouble, since problems of dualism
arise here. How can an immaterial substance have an effect on a material world? Though
this question is valid, it should not cause one to at once deny the sense of God being
immaterial. One could instead, having adopted the appropriate viewpoint, deem the world
immaterial in order to solve this problem. One could also instead question scriptural
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truth, specifically when it comes to the account of God interacting in physical ways.
Either way, this is not to at once deny the immateriality of God.
The Concept of God as Personal
In Judeo-Christian religion, man is seen as “made in God’s image” (The Holy
Bible, Genesis 1: 27). Moreover, several times in the bible, God talks to and interacts
with people. In Judaism, the Torah instructs God’s law, in part. In the New Testament,
Jesus is in a way identifiable with God. Prayer, which is talking to God, is incorporated
into both Judaism and Christianity. There are several biblical examples and other
examples beyond the ones here that allow one to establish that there is a connection or
communication line between people and God. This makes a Judeo-Christian God a
personal God; moreover, it makes it so that there is a God who communicates with
individual selves or groups of selves. In this way, God is a party distinct from the party of
the self, while God remains personal. Additionally, this personalism is a part of the
exoteric component of religions, where there is a relationship between an individual and
God, mediated through prayer and simply by following traditions and adhering to the
culture of a certain religion.
The Concept of God as Infinite
God is eternal, and exists without beginning or end (Quinn, 257). This is to say
that God is infinite. The importance of infinity as it pertains to God can be explained as
such: if God were not infinite, God would be unrecognizable as God. God would then by
necessity be considered finite—and a finite God is a limited God—a bordered, defined,
formalized God. This would make God with beginning and end; it would make God have
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size; God would no longer be beyond all the things that God is necessarily and
indubitably not. Moreover, in Judeo-Christian religion, the greatness of God is praised,
and God is praised because God is eternal and everlasting. If anything is to be sacrificed
from the conception of God, infinity would be the last attribute one should sacrifice—it is
the most fundamental characteristic of the concept of God.
This infinity aspect of God closely aligns with God as omni—however they are
not the same. To say God is the all could still regard God as finite—that God is a
collection of all finite things is a possibility even when God is omni-qualified. But to say
God is infinite is to demand that God is the all without a doubt, for in this way the all
would be a necessary infinitude—that there is a limitless amount of things and God is all
of them. In this way, God as infinite remains more fundamental than God as all, since the
infinite necessarily contains the all, but the all does not necessarily contain the infinite.
Moreover, to imagine a personal God as a finite God is to consider the possibility
that at some point, the communication line between God and the self may cease. This is
ridiculous. God is great because God is always there, and always there for one to talk to.
And to imagine God as not having to be Judeo-Christian in general is not that difficult of
a task—there are plenty other religions centered on God—but to regard God in any
religion as finite would be to deem God as having an end, or a beginning—and to do so is
to invite not only something like God that is just as great—it is to invite the possibility of
something greater than God, as either before, after, or merely outside of or beyond God;
and this mortality of God is not only a grave miscalculation, but an unrelentingly
suffocating doom.
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STEP 2: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF REASON
Several things can be said regarding God as omni-qualified. One of them is that
logical problems arise between the attributes when one realizes that there are certain
phenomena an omni-qualified God of the aforementioned sort cannot reasonably allow.
Some aspects of the concept do not allow for others; they would be mutually exclusive if
logic were to be in charge. In short, the concept of God being discussed here is of selfcontradiction or paradox and defies logic.
The Problem of Evil
In Routledge’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
The so called ‘logical’ problem of evil rests on the contention that the following
two claims of biblical theism (I) God exists, and is essentially omnipotent,
omniscient and perfectly good; and (II) evil exists, combine with the following
plausible attribute analyses: (P1) a perfectly good being would always eliminate
evil so far as it could; (P2) an omniscient being would know all about evils and
(P3) there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do, to form an
inconsistent quintet... (Craig, 466-467).
This formulation of the problem of evil in particular first of all clarifies the problem of
evil as a logical one, in spite of the fact that it is considered a “so called” logical problem
in the aforementioned paragraph. Secondly and more importantly, it reveals that the
problem extends beyond just stating God’s omni-qualification, as elucidated by P1-3.
These said propositions or qualifiers of God’s omni-attributes show how they interact in
order for the problem of evil to reveal itself. To reformulate: If God is omnibenevolent
and omnipresent, how can evil exist? Or, to reformulate: if God is omnibenevolent and
omnipotent, how would God let evil happen? Moreover, to look at God beyond omni-
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qualified and as merely conceived through Judeo-Christian, since God is the Creator of
the world, omnipresent and omni-benevolent, how can evil exist?
The Problem of Free Will
Another problem that stems from God’s omni-qualification is the problem of free
will:
“Roughly, the problem is that if there is an omniscient God, his knowledge would
presumably encompass all of the future, including the future acts of human
beings. And we would expect an omniscient deity’s powers of knowing to be so
strong that not only does he have no false beliefs, it is impossible for him to have
false beliefs. But if it is impossible for God’s belief about a future human act to be
false, it seems impossible for that person to do otherwise. How, then, can her act
be free?” (Quinn, 291)
In other words, if God is omniscient and omnipotent, and God’s omniscience is infinite in
its scope and infallible in its accuracy, how can people ever make free choices? How can
one act freely if God knows one will act before one does? In this way it seems impossible
to fix this maze of contradiction.
The Problem of the Self
Recall how a personal God in particular makes it so that there are two distinct
parties: God and the self. Also recall how God is omnipresent. Here lies the problem of
the self: If God is omni-qualified, the nature of God is all. It means to say that God is all
things, and therefore that there is nothing that is not God, or no other thing that is not
God. In other words, to say that something is all means, among other things, that there is
nothing other than the all. Now, to say there is the all (simply that there is an all; simply
that it exists) and that there is a self is to say that there is something other than the all—
namely, the self. And if there is something other than the all, then the all is not really all.
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Of course, this problem extends to virtually anything distinct from God. It
illustrates God as separate from objects in general, whether that is an apple or a person.
Anything besides God reveals God in a light where God is not all. Of course, there is a
vast multitude of things which are not God. In fact, all other noted things besides the
notion of God elucidate God as anything but the all. God as a concept, via juxtaposition
of all other noted things, treats God as a single mass, and not at all an omni-mass.
Furthermore, to bring about pantheism and say that God is in all things is to still denote
separation or an “othering” between God and those things in which God is. In this way
pantheism seems to be unable to solve the problem of the self. On a final note, it should
be said that this problem is called the problem of the self and not the problem of the other
because of the highly elevated significance of the self in Judeo-Christian religion, as
noted earlier in the discussion of personalism and how it is a central part of the exoteric
aspect of a given religion. To reiterate in short, God as a being is one with which
communicating objects can communicate—and it is from this place in argument that the
problem of the self extends to the problem of the other.
Sophisticated Problems: The Problem of Evil and The Problem of Free Will
To further understand the nature of a problematic omni-qualified God, one should
see how the problem of evil and the problem of free will blend. Alvin Plantinga has a
famous argument which attempts to solve the problem of evil—but it is called the free
will defense. Beginning with the premises P1) God exists and P2) There is evil in the
world, Plantinga provides a third premise consistent with P1 and that entails P2
(Bernstein, 1). With regard to this premise,
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“According to Plantinga, an essence E suffers from transworld depravity if and
only if, for every world W such that E entails the properties is significantly free in
W and always does right in W, there is a state of affairs T and an action A such
that a) T is the largest state of affairs God strongly actualizes in W, b) A is
morally significant for E’s instantiation in W, and c) If God had strongly
actualized T, E’s instantiation would have gone wrong with respect to A.”
(Bernstein, 1)
To say the E’s instantiation would have gone wrong is to say that if God had
strongly actualized T in w, E would be unable to perform or execute A such that A would
not manifest and so far as it is known would not exist. It is to say that an agent E would
be unable to perform an action A with any freedom, since God would have strongly
actualized the world, given God’s omnipotence. In essence, to solve the problem of evil
according to Plantinga is in a way to disallow human freedom in human action and thus
to trade it for the problem of free will.
To understand Plantinga another way, one should see that God could not create a
world with good and without evil, since to create a world without evil would be to not
wholly allow free will within the world’s current state of affairs, at least in so far as being
unable to perform evil acts with freedom (Lafollette, 1). This of course is to see
Plantinga as having presumed free will before the problem of evil, as opposed to—as
listed above—trading one problem for another. But this seems to allow for evil and
discount the possibility for free will.
Moreover, the notion of human freedom or human evil versus natural freedom or
natural evil has been brought up in response to Plantinga’s argument (Johnson, 1). For to
say that evil is brought about by human freedom is not the whole story with regard to the
problem of evil: natural evil exists as well. Moreover, it has even been gone on to say that
natural evil is needed for human evil—for to act in a certain way requires knowledge
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from experience of how to act a certain way, and there must have been at least one person
who observed evil not from other people but from nature in order for them to know how
to freely act in an evil way (Moser, 1).
Perhaps this is why Plantinga labels agents as “essences” (as seen above) and not
as merely humans. Indeed this would be to say that an essence is free, human or
otherwise. Evil in this way can still be brought about by freedom, but it does not need to
be brought by human freedom. This is to say that natural forces are free, as the argument
would entail. But whether or not this premise, though it seems to be entailed, is true is
another discussion entirely. Here at minimum the entailed premised will merely be held
to a standard of skepticism—that is to say, one should not at first glance take it as truth.
In this way, one may see that the problem of evil extends beyond human evil; and that it
is more widely mixed with the problem of free will.
Sophisticated Problems: God as Concept and God as Infinite
Problems arise here when it is realized the incompatibility between the nature of
concepts and the nature of God, for, as it has been established, concepts are finite
whereas God is infinite. In other words, one may struggle to see how this is possible: how
is a finite conception of an infinite being possible? Perhaps the way to address this is to
determine exactly how one familiarizes oneself with God with regard to reason. To be
clear, it must denoted exactly what is meant by conception.
There are two types of conceptions: purely linguistic or semantic conceptions and
visual conceptions held by the mind’s eye. An example of the former would be the
qualities of an orange (orangeness, roundness, etc.) as well as other things about it (such

11

as that it is a fruit). An example of the latter would be an image of an orange—a
visualization in the mind’s eye. If one pays attention to visual concepts, one realizes that
they are rather foggy—one does not see them as clearly as one does objects in the
external world. But one sees that they have a similar element of distinctness—things in
the mind’s eye alone remain discernable. Likewise, more immaterial or less sensory
conceptions, i.e. linguistic conceptions are discernable in their own way as well. One
knows the difference between orangeness and roundness and between apples and oranges
simply by realizing that in this sentence two different things are being talked about.
Recall how God is infinite, immaterial, and personal and omnipresent. These
rational ways of knowing God in particular come in to play here. To say God is
immaterial is to at once disallow God to be known as a visual concept, but at this point,
this is not to say that God as immaterial cannot be known in the linguistic conceptual
sense—for one should understand what is meant by something being immaterial.
Moreover, the external world as it is a sensory world is necessarily finite—things begin
and end, are limited and have boundaries, etc. insofar as one’s conceptions of them- one
understand s the sensory world as full of distinction. But if God is infinite, can God even
exist in the external world? Where else would God be? Would God be in one’s mind? If
God is personal, God is other from the self, and God cannot be in solely my mind and at
the same time other than me, since my mind is me. One could bring about the idea of a
collective consciousness of God—but this is still to say that God exists only mentally.
Should there be an external world, then this would be to deny omnipresence.
It seems here that where God exists must be addressed. One could argue the
following: one can only know that God exists only insofar as one claims that God does.
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This would not be redundant—it shows, for instance, that one has no way of knowing,
but there is a God is nonsense, for to take such a claim—or any claim, for that matter—
for what it really means is to take it as pretexted by one knowing about it. This dynamic
would ultimately become then: one knows that one does not know, but one knows. This,
of course, would be silly, and a contradiction. In this way, one’s understanding,
knowledge, or familiarization with God would be strictly confined to one’s conception of
it. What one would have to ultimately admit then is that God exists only insofar as one’s
conception of God, which would be to say that God, along with everything else, is
conception in other words, that God is purely mental, and there is really no such thing as
an external world, at least insofar as one knows.
But to say God is purely idea or concept and to furthermore deny the existence of
a world external to one’s mind would be to miss the mark with regard to a JudeoChristian God. First of all, idealism in the strict sense is grossly preceded a JudeoChristian God in a historical sense. Moreover, one never thinks that God is treated in any
way other than under a realist approach—that is to say, to see God under a framework
that does not involve an external world independent of one’s mind seems rather
ludicrous. There is no memorable place in Judeo-Christian religion that comes to mind
where God is portrayed as idealistic. It simply seems beyond us. Of course, to once again
denote God as externally real would be to visit once more the immateriality and infinity
problems—for the external world is exactly what God is not in these senses.
Luckily, Anselm's ontological argument proves that God can't be just in the mind,
for if God is "a being than which nothing greater can be conceived", God existing in the
mind and in the external world is greater than God existing in just the mind (Internet
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Encyclopedia of Philosophy). That said, this proof is rooted in the mind alone—it is a
priori—and it has implications beyond the mind, which seems to be troublesome.
Moreover, proofs and arguments about God from other philosophers, like Augustine, are
just as unprotected from such trouble. In short, even the most sound proofs are prone to
problems. It is precisely because of this truth that reconciliation is required.
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STEP 3: THE RECONCILIATIONS OF REASON
Now that the logical problems of such a concept of God have been laid out, it
should be noted that logic or reason itself cannot solve the problems it has created. In
other words, it would make no sense for the source of the problems to be the resolver of
the very same problems: logic’s rules are responsible for the aforementioned problems,
and logic would have to forfeit these rules in order to reconcile such problems; but then
logic would no longer be logic, since logic is logic on the very basis of these rules. In this
way, such contradictions must be reconciled outside the confines of logic and reason;
they must be resolved in other ways.
Kierkegaard’s Paradoxical Faith
It is good to note that such a concept of God is one that is well-defined. However,
still one runs into shortcomings and contradictions at every corner. Indeed, philosophy
can aide this problem of religion. A philosopher by the name of Kierkegaard, in his book
called Fear and Trembling, writes about the story of Abraham and Isaac, the relevancy of
which will soon be revealed. He specifically writes how Abraham was asked to and was
ready to sacrifice his Isaac, his son, to God:
"And God tempted Abraham and said to him, take Isaac, your only son, whom
you love, and go to the land of Moriah and offer him there as a burnt offering on a
mountain which I will show you." (Kierkegaard, 10)
To begin the reconciliation of reason, one must first realize that this
commandment to Abraham contained in the aforementioned passage is one of assorted
contradiction: Abraham has not only been promised a bloodline; he has also been
instructed to not kill. Moreover, to kill a son would be the most trepid killing of all
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possible killings, to say the least. Nonetheless, Abraham has been instructed to kill his
son from whom he was also told a bloodline would emerge; and he has been told not to
kill, and to kill, specifically his son, by God. To say this commandment is a test of faith
is, however accurate, a seemingly rash understatement of the nature of God’s demand.
Among all the ways in which he can act with respect to the three stages on life’s
way (Stack), among the ways of the hedonist who seeks pleasure, the hero who follows a
moral compass, and the religious man, Abraham acts in such a way that a religious man
or a man of faith would act. And faith, according to Kierkegaard, is “the teleological
suspension of the ethical” (Kierkegaard, 54). This is to say that one must disregard or at
the very least temporarily suspend morality as grounds for action in order to perform an
act of faith. Specifically this refers to Abraham’s suspension of the biblical and moral law
“do not kill” (amongst other immoral laws he would have broken with his act of killing)
for it seems that such a moral basis must have been forgotten or transcended or in some
way not ordinarily understood by Abraham in order for him to be able to kill his son.
Moreover, faith is the individual being higher than the universal (Kierkegaard, 55). This
speaks to faith not only as transcending the ethical but also as it being completely
paradoxical in its very nature, for logically the universal is supposed to transcend or
encompass the individual, not the reverse. In this way, faith seems to be a transcendence
or suspension of not only morality but of reason as well.
However unintentionally, this is Kierkegaard’s reconciliatory effect in the sense
that he considers faith to be a paradox. For when he discusses faith as being paradoxical,
though he means to or not, he solves the problems of reason with regard to the concept of
an omni-qualified God. For if God is omni-qualified but as a logical consequence is
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riddled with illogicality as well, though one’s understanding of God in the rational sense
may be bogus, to have faith in God in spite of this contradiction is what Kierkegaard
suggests by analogy of the story of Abraham: though God made no sense with regard to
reason, Abraham had still had faith in his transcendence of it.
To be even more clear, to reiterate some of the aforementioned logical problems
from the perspective of faith, for example, is to say that one must not resort to atheism
under contradictions involving God, but that when God cannot seem to be omnipresent
and at the same time distinct from the self, and that when God cannot seem to be
omnipotent and omnibenevolent with regard to the problem of evil, that one must have
faith: have faith that God is omni-qualified, even though and in spite of the fact that an
omni-qualified God ultimately makes no logical sense.
Furthermore, to address contradiction from the standpoint of reason would be to
see it as a problem to knowledge; to address it from the standpoint of faith would be to
see it not necessarily as knowledge but as a way to familiarize oneself with God, for such
paradox and illogicality seems fundamental to faith. Moreover, paradox and reason all
together exist purely mentally. To say that logicality and illogicality exist beyond the
mind would be to misunderstand the nature of reason. Reason and problems thereof are
mental phenomena. In this way, to shift one’s perspective on the matter of contradiction
insofar as contradiction is purely mental is to transform the nature of contradiction, for if
reason cannot possibly exist beyond the mind, then anything influenced by or influencing
reason or any elements of it—contradiction included—would be to at the same time
necessarily change or transform the nature of reason or an element of it. In this way, the
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paradox of reason in the mind’s eye and in its totality literally becomes the paradox of
faith.
In sum, one sees how reason with regard to an omni-qualified God falls short
when measured against the standard of reason, but not against the standard of
Kierkegaardian faith. All the same, to say that one must have faith in God in spite of this
contradiction, or to realize that only through illogicality does one come to be faithful is to
suggest a dependency faith has on reason, which is arguably a defect of faith. But,
beyond this, faith in the way that has been explained above is successfully reconciliatory
to problems of reason with respect to God.
Why one does this—why one teleologically suspends the ethical—is perhaps done
for the very sake of reconciling reason, for knowing God paradoxically. As the story
goes, Abraham did this because he was commanded by God to do so, but perhaps this
was God's way of asking Abraham to know him in an extraordinary way. The teleological
suspension of the ethical would then be a different way of knowing God. It would surely
be a shock that that one would put so much at stake to just know God in a different way,
but from this shock it would be evident that one would be missing the point.
Schuon’s Transcendence of Symbolization
It is first and foremost important to establish that Frithjof Schuon’s subject matter
is the absolute. Evidence that attests to this includes the title of his book’s first chapter,
The Sense of the absolute in religions. Moreover, Schuon explains in the very beginning
of this book entitled Gnosis: Divine Wisdom how the diversity of religion beckons one to
know of the common essence hidden within and among all religious phenomena, i.e. the
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absolute (Schuon, 1). Finally, on page 10 of his Gnosis, Schuon explicitly uses the word
God in his writing (Schuon, 10). The absolute that Schuon refers to here is God, and that
God is his discussion: for all religions aim at some object which is transcendent of a life
without religious phenomena. It is higher thing; God. Moreoveer, terminology such as
“gnosis” and “divine” refer to God.
Very early on in Gnosis: Divine Wisdom, specifically on page 10, Schuon
explicitly mentions “the limitations of human logic” (Schuon, 10). However, he begins
the general discussion of this Schuonian solution one page earlier. Schuon discusses
“historicity” of religious phenomena, or the phenomena in a “mythological form”
(Schuon, 9). This historicity is a component of the exoteric aspect of a given religion,
such that it is a part of it's culture, and it is in this discussion of God first and foremost
referring not to the contradictions of religion but to the mere historical or mythological
backdrop on which it is fundamentally based. The prime example of this is the Bible in
Christianity. Another example is the Torah or the Old Testament in Judaism. Each
scriptural text is written in some storytelling mode, whether that be factual or not, and
this is what Schuon means when he discusses historicity.
Regarding this historicity, Schuon claims that “there is no metaphysical or
spiritual difference between a truth manifested by temporal facts and a truth expressed by
other symbols… the modes of manifestation correspond to the mental requirements of
different human groups” (Schuon, 9). This is to say that the temporal or historical
expression of a truth is not different from a truth expressed in a different way—in this
case, the truth being God. In other explanatory terms, each way is merely a different
means of expressing or manifesting that which is being expressed, as each way is

19

contingent upon different mental requirements. To be clear, truth expressed temporally or
historically demands a different cognition than truth expressed in a different way, or
through a different means. Moreover, these means are not the same either: some means
are temporal and historical and others are not. But to say that the means are different is to
not see the whole picture, for they are not different in the sense that they express and are
symbolic of the same thing. This thing that is expressed by multiple means is God.
In short, Schuon is arguing for the historicity of religion to be just one way of
understanding God. He then goes on to say something more striking: “if certain
mentalities prefer marvels that are empirically improbable over historical reality, this is
precisely because the marvelous indicates transcendence in relation to terrestrial facts”
(Schuon, 9-10). The key here is transcendence of terrestrial facts; however one must
explain why it is so crucial first. Schuon brings up the notion of a marvel: by here he
means miracle, or something similar to it. In essence a marvel is something that makes no
sense on a rational level but happens nonetheless. Jesus rising, the Red Sea parting, the
Burning Bush: it is an event, an impossible experience now made possible and real. And
marvels are empirically based in reality. Schuon claims marvels are real in his
presupposed notion of marvel: his very discussion of them denotes their inherency in his
argument: he would not talk about them if they weren’t real.
Schuon also claims that some mentalities prefer these marvels as improbabilities.
This is to say that mentalities abound (scientists, skeptics, etc.) doubt marvels as existing
or real. Yet some people claim this over reality, which is to say that some people do
believe that miracles are indeed real in history. And it is from the fact that some people
doubt the existence of marvels and not believe in them that makes Schuon’s statement

20

regarding the transcendence of terrestrial facts valid. For to consider the marvelous as, in
a mentality of a certain kind, making no sense, to not believe in them for the very reason
that they are impossible by their very quality and essence is to deem the marvelous at
least not grounded in the mentality of this sense, which is to say that miracles or marvels
are unfamiliar to reason but not to a different mentality, for reason dictates this
impossibility by its very structure, but other mentalities may not. Schuon elaborates: the
aspect of this improbable or impossible or nonsensical attribute of the marvelous is
precisely what makes it transcendent of reason itself (Schuon, 9-10).
Finally, on top of the nonsense of historicity of God according to reason with
regard to marvels, Schuon finally includes logical problems in his wisdom as well to
provide in all aspects how rational symbols on an intellectual level indeed point to
something else:
The appropriateness of mythological marvels on the one hand and the existence of
contradictions between religions on the other- which do not imply an intrinsic
absurdity within any given religion any more than do the internal contradictions
found in all religion- show in their own way that, with God, truth lies above all in
the symbol’s effective power of enlightenment and not in its literalness (Schuon,
10).
This is to say that, firstly, as was just mentioned, that the historicity of marvels in
connection to God are only the half of it: there is contradiction as well. In this way, this
historicity, which is empirical, is coupled with logic, which is rational. Up to this point,
or so far as it has been revealed here, this coupling refers to the intellect in its entirety
insofar as it is a knower or a familiarizer: one that observes sensory information and
analyzes and in general cognizes rationally. Specifically, with regard to logic, Schuon
references not only contradictions within religions (as discussed before) but also across
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religions (one example that comes to mind is the claim that Jesus is the Messiah: in
Christianity this is true while in Judaism this is not); and with regard to the empirical
historicity, Schuon, as it has been mentioned, discusses marvels.
But in essence, marvels and contradictions seem to be the problems of the
intellect in its entirety as a familiarizer or a knower. And yet, as this brings up a second
point, Schuon claims that they do not imply an intrinsic absurdity. This is clearly not true
from the standpoint or perspective of the intellect itself: according to the intellect,
historicity with regard to marvels and contradictions seem completely absurd indeed. In
this way, the only way such problems can escape or even resolve this absurdity is to
understand them from a different angle.
Schuon claims that the truth about God lies above the symbol. This means that the
symbol itself; and the intellect itself (the intellect produces the symbol, and so the symbol
talk entails intellect talk) are insufficient for truth, as it has been explained, and that the
real truth transcends the symbolization of the intellect, not in its literalness. Moreover,
Schuon believes this very insufficiency of the symbol points at this transcendence. In a
certain and quite peculiar way, without the problems of historicity and logic, the very
transcendence of them would be unfamiliar. This is the talk of Schuon when he discusses
the symbol’s power of enlightenment: it begins with the insufficiency of the symbol and
ends with leaving it for something higher.
Still, what remains to be pondered is this: what exactly is this something higher?
What is this alternative to the intellect in its very entirety as it has been explained, what is
this transcendent familiarizer? How must one familiarize oneself with God without the
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intellect? Before this question is answered, it must not be forgotten how crucial the
intellect is and moreover how the very thing that transcends it relies on it in order for God
to be revealed to us.
In essence, the thing that transcends the intellect must completely leave it behind.
This is to say that such a thing is the very absence of reason, the absence of empiricism. It
is not irrationality but nonrationality. It is not unobservable but nonobservable. It is not
the opposite of reason or the intellect or anything of the sort; it is completely beyond it
and without it. In short, this transcendent familiarizer is a higher cognition or a higher
consciousness.
But one can’t even call it that. A higher consciousness, if too describable, seems
remarkably strikingly similar to an ordinary consciousness, the one of reason and
empiricism, the one through which the exoteric element of religions cannot be without,
the one through which one operates. In this way, no more can be said beyond what has
already been said, not just because that which is indescribable does not exist, but because
it would be describing the indescribable, and because one is incapable of knowing about
it from a place where one can describe it even in an abstract a way as this. In short, the
only way to know about it is to experience it, to become it and think through: this
consciousness, this new place. It is from here that this paper shall delve into the
discussion of the mystic experience.
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STEP 4: THE MEANS OF EXPERIENCE
Just like one can know or, in looser terms, familiarize oneself with God via
reason or rationality, one can do the same with experience. And, just like there are several
specific ways in which one can familiarize oneself with God within the confines of
reason, there are several specific ways in which can do so within the confines of
experience: supernatural experiences, shamanic experiences, unitive experiences in
nature, and other similar experiences are all examples; but each of these is attributable to
some kind of greater or more abstract experience where one becomes close to “something
greater.” Whether that is nature, spirit, or what have you, this something more tends to be
nonphysical and literally extraordinary; and this seems to point at the fact that
phenomena of this greater sort are really just portions of or the whole of a greater being
proper, which means that they are of God. Moreover, these aforementioned examples
share a common element: unity or transcendence. Supernatural experiences of ghosts or
supernatural phenomena or spirits point to something “beyond” the world as one knows it
ordinarily or physically; experiences in nature are of unity with nature or of some
euphoria which seems to transcend common states of being. In this way, unity and
transcendence seem to become attributable to God. In either case, whether the experience
is unitive or transcendent, the experiencer becomes acquainted with something “more.”
Perhaps the most unitive and transcendent experience of all is one called the mystic or
zero experience. It will be the focus of this section of this thesis.
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The Mystic Experience under Scrutiny
Before explaining the mystic experience, it should be noted that the mystic
experience in particular is an experience that would under a modern empirical lens be
highly scrutinized (would be because it is undetermined if it indeed is scrutinized by
modern empiricism). The foundation of empiricism is precisely physicality: that which is
empirical or observable is nothing other than that which is physical (one perceives and
senses with a physical body which is in turn physical and sensory); anything transcendent
of it is excluded from empiricism. Indeed, modern science is the knowledge or
information that is considered conventional or reliable today, in this age. Talk of such
science today is taken as talk of truth. Likewise, talk of anything non-physical or of
“believing without seeing” is tabooed and stigmatized; in fact, such talk is the center of
fantasy movies such as the “The Polar Express” (The Polar Express), suggesting the
nonreality or falsehood of such talk.
Personal religion itself is scrutinized under an empirical lens due to its emphasis
on non-physicality (God is deemed incorporeal; fasts incorporated in several religions
such as Judaism and Islam restrict one from eating, which is a physical activity and
specifically one of the body; modern science’s story of evolution is rejected by devout
Christians given the creation story included in the Old Testament). Even so, personal
religion has a large enough presence in human culture today that such scrutiny can be
overlooked, or at least is not as scrutinized as mysticisms or spiritual doctrines which are
not as popular. One speaks of Christianity commonly- it is part of pop culture and the
average Western civilian knows about it. Mysticism and spirituality is a different story:
the esoteric and less practical or less tradition-based doctrines are held to a higher degree
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of doubt and rejection—at the very least when held to an empirical measure (beyond
holding such doctrines to this specific measure would be rejecting them on the basis of
social inclusion, which in this case would be found in adherence to social stigma).
Personal religion is based in faith, whether that faith is community-based, scripturally
based, or not based in any proof or reason at all, whereas mystical and spiritual doctrines,
at least of the kind to which it has been referred to in this thesis, is based anecdotally or,
if one should prefer, by baseless and thus pure faith.
The Mystic Experience as Personal or Anecdotal
The mystic experience is an experience. Others know that one has experiences
because they trust one when one communicates to them that they have had them. In this
way, knowledge of experience is either based in personal experience or in trusting that
others’ experiences are true. The mystic experience is no different. If one has not had the
mystic experience themselves, they may rely on others’ anecdotes of the experience for
proof or evidence of its existence or realness. Beyond personal experiences, anecdotes
may be the only way in which people know about the mystic experience. Even still,
knowledge of the mystic experience insofar as it is anecdotal requires an element of
belief as well, in fact fundamentally, such that anecdotes regarding the mystic experience,
and all other experiences for that matter, are completely unknown if one does not trust the
anecdote as truth. The validity of subjective psychological reports are also held under
scrutiny. This is why, especially for experiences that are stigmatized like the mystic
experience, this element of trust, the level of trust one gives to a friend, becomes even
more important; and this is why it mustn't be forgotten that people simply struggle to
believe what they themselves don't believe, and that this way of thinking is due in part to
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human nature and in part to societal norms, neither of which are reliable sources of direct
truth in and of themselves.
On a personal level, the mystic experience is truly nothing more than experiential;
one cannot know it through rationality because it is not conceptual or idea-like. If
anything, it may be a memory in which sensory data is contained, but this is not to say
that it is rational; moreover, even to consider the proof of the mystic experience as a
memory is inaccurate, the reason for which shall soon be revealed. In short, the mystic
experience cannot be known beyond anecdote or “memory.” It literally is known only as
an experience.
For the purposes of this thesis, the focus will primarily be on the mystic
experience being known anecdotally. Fortunately, as Jordan Paper writes in The Mystic
Experience, there are thousands of accounts of the mystic experience which can be found
in the RERC (Religious Experience Research Centre) archives (Paper, 12). Paper himself
draws at least a dozen for his work, presenting anecdotes of people whose stories have
been recorded and collected for the RERC archives. These people range from different
places across the globe; these people also differ in their ages as well. Such an experience
such as the mystic experience then does not seem to favor any one type of person over
any other; some are not even religious. Experiences of the mystic type therefore happen
rather randomly. This is not to say that religious people do not have the mystic
experience, however. Paper also includes anecdotes of “professional mystics” whose
religions are Indian, Islamic, Christian, and so on (Paper, 23-28). In short, though the
amount of people who have the mystic experience is a small percentage of the entire
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human population, when un-compared and not held to any measure but its own, such a
proportion should be seen as a plethora of people who have experienced it.
The Mystic Experience’s Outline
In the very beginning of his book The Mystic Experience, Jordan Paper discusses
his own mystic experience, the context in which it was brought about, and the general
guidelines for the mystic or zero experience (Paper, 1-5). To very briefly describe his
experience (which presumably prompted the creation of his here-mentioned work),
Paper’s experience in particular began in a place of peace: he was very still, lying down,
relaxed, in a chill place. All of a sudden, a light descended to him and broke out into
something more encompassing— the mystic experience.
In Paper’s personal instance of the mystic experience, his state was one of
stillness (Paper, 1-2); the light came to him instead of ascension to some overwhelming
(yet bearable) light. Such variance in how one experiences this prolific light is just one of
several different ways one can experience the mystic experience (Paper, 3-4). Prior to
experiencing such light, one is either “still” or “moving in [automatic and not conscious]
routinized movements” (Paper, 3). Then, one feels a “merging” or “unity”, either as a
union with all or all coming in to oneself. Such is the diversity but also the commonality
of the mystic experience. Respectively, the background somatic state for the experiencer
which acts as a kind of precursor for the mystic experience is uniform or consistent,
either in the state’s lack of or repetition of movement; though the described union with all
is described diversely, in each description the experiencer feels a sort of merging. Finally,
the unity with a sense or power of light, however it happens, still happens.
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Such is the nature of the mystic experience prior to it being a zero experience:
after initially experiencing becoming united with light, the unity’s rate of speed increases
(Paper, 4), almost as if it would bring one to “something.” Interestingly, it does not. The
increasing rate of speed in fact brings one to a state of nothingness. Moreover, though it
is voluntary, and though one comes out of it , Paper writes that such a state is a “loss of
self” (Paper, 4), and that some even choose to stay solid, for lack of better word (Paper,
12-24). Additionally, before and after the dissolution of the self, there is a loss of and
subsequent regaining of the distinction of things (Paper, 3-4). This is of course very
peculiar, on surface level and under examination. Certainly, questions come to mind upon
describing the experience as one of nothingness and the experiencer as absent. The
principle of sufficient reason states that something cannot come from nothing (Melamed).
It is from here that this paper delves into the discussion of the shortcomings of the mystic
experience.
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STEP 5: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF EXPERIENCE
The fact that there is a loss of self in the mystic experience is to imply that the
experiencer, let alone a self in general, is not present, which is to say they are not present
in general nor more specifically are they present in order to experience to the mystic
experience—or at the very least a part of the mystic experience. The problem here is a
verifiability problem, and it is threefold: firstly, how can an experiencer have an
experiencer when the experiencer is not present to have the experience? It is to suppose
that something which ceases to exist even temporarily is able to create and does create
and even more can remember something that exists, which is the experience. This is
absurd, since that which does not exist cannot create that which does exist. Secondly, the
very experience which is considered something is necessarily a state of emptiness or a
“zero state.” If the experiencer is absent, it seems that the only thing an absent
experiencer can generate is a state of absence or in other words a state of nothingness, for
if something cannot come from nothing, nothing comes from nothing. In this way, the
only experience an absent experiencer can have is of nothing. And what is an experience
of nothing? Thirdly, how is it possible for a state of nothing to be describable, even as
simply as it being described as a state of nothing? One understands the meaning of the
term “nothing” in the abstract just as one understands it when juxtaposed to the term
“something”; however, one does not understand and cannot understand the thing of which
the state of nothing is. Given all of this, from here the first two formulations of this
verifiability problem together will be addressed; then the third will be addressed.
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The Intertwined Problems of Verifiability and Understanding
How can an experiencer remember an experience they were not there to
experience? If an experiencer is absent, then nothing can have the experience, since
nothing is there. In a way, to say that the experience does not belong to any present
experiencer is the root of the problem as it is described in the primary formulation written
about in this paragraph. Additionally, the experiencer cannot remember an experience if
the experiencer is not there to experience it. This makes the experience unverifiable.
Even more so, the absent experiencer cannot even himself personally perceive or
mentally bring to him or herself the experience since again such an experiencer is absent.
This makes the experience unperceivable or unrecordable. In this way, the experiencer
makes the experience unowned, unverifiable and unrecordable.
Furthermore, how can a state of nothingness be experienced? What is it to
experience nothing? As alluded to earlier in this section, the experience is a “zero state”:
since an experience cannot exist without an experiencer, experiences are contingent not
only upon experiencers but also the qualities these experiencers exhibit as well, including
the quality of nothingness. Therefore, if the experiencer is not, the experience is of
nothing. In other words, as it has been explained previously, something cannot come
from nothing, and so nothing can come from nothing. In this way, one has no idea of
understanding or knowing what the experience is of. On a final note regarding this
formulation, one says that at this point, one understands how the focus in this formulation
is on how the experience itself is problematic rather than how the experiencer makes it
problematic (as it was explained in the formulation prior to this one).
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In sum, to understand the dualistic problem of a dissolved self having an
experience conjoined with the problem of an experience of nothing is to say that even
though something (the experience, if it were of something) cannot come from nothing
(the loss of self), maybe more nothing (the experience as it actually is) can come from it
instead. Clearly, to say that more nothing can come from nothing sounds just as
ridiculous as saying that something can come from nothing. It is true that nothing comes
from nothing, but to say that more nothing can come from nothing is to imply that this
nothing is quantifiable, which is absurd as only somethings are indeed quantifiable. To
even deem nothing potent of generative power, even of nothing, sounds ludicrous.
The Problem of Ineffability
It has been established that in the mystic experience the self or the experiencer is
not present and that the experience is of nothing. This is the backbone of the verifiability
problem and the understanding problem. Beyond this problem lies the problem of
ineffability: because it seems impossible to understand what the mystic experience is of,
it beckons one to ask how one should describe it; even before this, it beckons one to ask
whether such a task is possible or not. Of course the intuitive answer is quite simple:
what one cannot understand, one cannot speak about, let alone think about—at least with
clarity. Such an answerer may be inclined to say: “if the mystic experience is of
nothingness, the entire subject matter is pointless.” Such an inclination to answer in such
a hasty way is hereby called into doubt. Still, this phenomenon poses itself to be quite a
confusing condition of the mystic experience—especially when looked at first glance.
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The Significance of Nothingness in the Zero-Experience
It is important and certainly unworthy of removal to recognize how silly it is to
deem a zero experience even an experience at all. Indeed, experiences are necessarily of
things; to say it is not of anything but to say that it is an experience sounds horrifying.
One can overlook this: although the zero-portion included in the mystic experience is
only a portion of it (indeed, other portions included in the mystic experience which are
not of nothing are indeed substantive and memorable, which in turn implies that one
could forgot about the zero-portion of the mystic experience altogether and accept what
one can verify as enough), this portion of the mystic experience is paramount in its
importance over the others.
The justification of the esteemed significance of this portion is multifold, but
since to reveal the majority of them in this section would be to discuss what will be
discussed in the following section, to avoid redundancy as well as getting ahead of
myself, right now, what will be said is this: when it is recalled that the mystic
experience’s experiencer is still present for the period of time coming into and out of the
immense being of powerful light (this is made apparent by their recollection of this
portion of the experience); they are not present however while one with it. And since the
rate of speed in this merging process increases yet ends at the zero-portion of the
experience, it is grounds for believing that what such a merging leads to is the very heart
and perhaps even the very root of the experience.
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STEP 6: THE RECONCILIATIONS OF EXPERIENCE
With the problems of reason, it was made vividly apparent how contradiction
itself was the root issue found hidden beneath each problem in particular. Given that, the
reconciliation that followed addressed contradiction and limitations in reason directly,
mostly so that each problem in particular was solved as consequential to the solution of
the more general or inclusive problem. Such a structure of addressing the root and
thereby healing the entire tree so to speak does not apply in this case. With experience,
each problem in particular must be dealt with individually.
Reconciling the Intertwined Problems of Verifiability and Understanding
Recall how this problem can be reformulated as the intertwined problems of the
dissolution of self (which leads to the problem of verifiability) and the problem of a
nothing experience (which leads to the problem of understanding). In this section, the
problem of a nothing experience is the best place to begin reconciliation.
An aid in the confusion of trying to understand the nothing or zero experience, it
is paramount to suggest that such an experience is an experience of God. If one assumes
that the mystic experience is an experience of God, one realizes that an experience of
God—though it must not be—most sensibly can be an experience of either everything or
nothing, and that an experience of everything or of nothing surely sounds like an
experience of God, for God is the all, and the all is everything.
The argument for the above begins as such: to experience God in a certain way—
which is to say, in a way that is substantive and positive, where the experience is of
something—may very well to be misrepresent an experience of God, at least in God’s
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totality (to experience something may be to experience a part of God). For any
experience of something must necessarily be defined (just like an experience of nothing
is undefined); that which is defined cannot describe any more than what it defines (an
experience of eating an apple cannot be described as hitting a nail with a hammer—the
hammer description falls outside the definition of the experience of apple-eating, and so
the definition of apple-eating only pertains to the experience of apple-eating, not beyond
it); and, since God is all, to experience God is to experience all things. Moreover, to
experience just something which is definable and therefore singular (like apple-eating) is
not to experience all things. Such an experience is not one of God in God’s totality. In
short, any experience of something that can be described at all is missing something else.
All substantive experiences are incomplete insofar as they fall short of the All, and so to
have an experience of something would be to not have it of God in God’s totality, since
God is not incomplete in any way, for God is the All. Therefore, to experience God in
one’s totality is to experience literally everything.
The above argument continues: to experience God as everything is to experience
God as nothing; there is no difference between the two experiences. To experience
everything is to experience all things in their definition, in their distinctness and finitude.
And to experience all finite things is to experience a finite amount of them. If things are
finite, to have an infinite amount of them would eventually be to have an infinite thing.
Imagine a grid on a piece of paper. Each individual and distinct thing in the world is
comparable to the content each separate square within the grid contains and to which it
forms and defines; all the squares comprise the totality of the grid, which itself is
comparable to all that is. Now, take away the grid and ponder what remains. Formless
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content, undefined being: conceivably, this amounts to nothing, but in reality, it remains
everything. Such is the nature of the mystic experience, where the distinction of all things
reappears when remerging from its zero portion and disappears before it, where God,
literally everything, is experienced without distinction, is experienced as nothing.
It is now seen how the problem of the understanding ultimately was “what is an
experience of nothing of?” and it is clear that such an experience is of the indistinct All,
of everything—of God. Furthermore, an experience of nothing and indistinctness clarifies
the experience of a loss of self: if a self is distinct (and it is—from other selves and from
all other things), to lose distinction is to include the loss of self. Indeed, this also makes
the mystic experience more verifiable then it was prior to reconciliation. To understand
that the self has not vanished but has only apparently disappeared, as its very definitional
boundaries disappeared, is to understand that there remained throughout the entire mystic
experience, including and with specific regard to the zero portion, a source, i.e. a self,
that could verify and recall the events that took place before and after the experience of
nothing. To say the experiencer vanished into thin air is not accurate: to say that the
experience became nothing in the sense of the experiencer’s distinct and defined being is
more on point. The self-indistinct is the self in God, and when the distinction of things
nullify, oneself and the rest merge with the All. It is in this way, then, that the grid
analogy in turn helps heal the problem of verifiability because it clarifies the loss of self
and in broader terms the very definition of all things existing.
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Reconciling the Problem of Ineffability
As it was explained before, the ineffability problem was based mutually on the
problem of verifiability and the problem of understanding. Given that these two problems
have been reconciled connectedly, one would hope that the problem of ineffability would
be reconciled in a similar effect. One’s hope would pay off. The ineffability problem at
its core is tied directly to the problem of the understanding: what one may not understand,
one cannot speak about. And now, what one understands, one may speak about.
Comparable Experiences
Perhaps a comparable experience to the mystic experience is the generation of
symbols. Tilich says that “symbols have on characteristic in common with signs; they
point beyond themselves to something else”, but unlike signs, symbols “participate in the
reality to which they point” (Tilich, 383-384). This comparison between symbols and
signs defines the nature of symbols in several ways. Firstly, a symbol is distinct from the
object to which it points. A waving American flag is a material entity, simply put. What it
points, or the object of which it is symbolic, as convention would have it, is patriotism.
Patriotism and a waving American are distinct, nonequivalent entities. Secondly, the
symbol participate in the object to which it points. The flag , however distinct it may be
from patriotism, participates in it. Symbols usual are symbolic of objects greater than the
entities which symbolize them. In this way, much like players participate in a game,
which is greater than even all of the players combined (it also has rules, referees, fans,
goals, and so on) the verb of participation makes sense. Hence, the relationship between
symbol and greater object is not distinct to the degree that the two are entirely separate,
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but to a lesser degree. The exact degree to which they are separate, however, is unclear.
Remarkably restated, the degree to which symbol and greater object are distinct is
indistinct.
Tilich also explains how symbols “open up levels of reality which otherwise are
closed for us” (Tilich, 384). A glorious singing performance is symbolic of some, for lack
of a better word, sensation we experience but perhaps cannot even describe. While the
performance is the symbol, this experience of awe we receive in our viewing of such a
performance is this special level of reality, the access of which is only granted by
experiencing the symbol, or the performance. Furthermore, Tilich explains that the
symbol also “unlocks dimensions and elements of our soul which correspond to the
dimensions and elements of reality”. If the soul is a knower of reality, symbols unlock
our souls first and then our other-level experiences.
Symbols also emerge from the unconscious (Tilich, 384). Choosing what object
becomes a symbol for another object is a rather arbitrary process which is made normal
by convention, but the actual selecting of what objects become symbols seems rather
arbitrary, at least on a conscious level. In this way, the selection of symbols is also
unintentional and not deliberate. We cannot invent them or will them into being.
Invention and intention are contingent upon being conscious, so if the selection is
unconscious, it is also unintentional and not up to us.
In sum, symbols are distinct from the greater object to which they point to an
indistinct degree; they provide special access into other-level reality; and their emergence
is not up to us. This definition of symbols is very much relatable to the Mystic
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Experience. The Mystic Experience is not up to us. It is most certainly an other-level
reality, and like symbols are not completely distinct from that to which they point, after a
Mystic Experience, we are not entirely distinct from it. Perhaps this incomplete
separation post-experience can be best explained simply by understanding the fact that
we leave it with a gift. If the Mystic Experience is truly as blissful and ecstatic as it is
described, a memory of its splendor is nothing short of an amazing prize. The
unconscious and unwilled zero experience, much like the unconscious and unwilled
production of a symbol, ends with the reception of a token, or a way of manifesting the
mysterious and making the ineffable effable. The experiences are not different from one
another, but given what they share, it is suggested that pre-token they are of the same
thing: an unmanifest nothingness, or God, from which creation begins.
Perhaps another comparable experience is laid out in Kierkegaard’s Unscientific
Postscript. In it, he claims that subjectivity becomes truth. In order to understand this,
many other things must first be understood. These other things include but are not limited
to Kierkegaard’s concepts of subjective reflection and objective reflection, inwardness,
infinite passion, and so on.
Subjective reflection is the reflecting on the relationship between subject and
object. For example, if I reflect on my relationship with my mother, I am engaging in
subjective reflection where I am the subject and my mother is the object. This is opposed
to objective reflection. In objective reflection, I reflect only on my mother. I reflect only
on the object (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 316). In this way, objective reflection
lacks the personal component of subjective reflection, namely, the subject, or the I. This
makes subjective reflection seem more complete than objective reflection.
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Inwardness is very much related to subjective reflection. Since subjective
reflection requires a subject, and subjective reflection does not involve just the object,
and the object is, in this stage of thinking about Kierkegaard, external to the subject, the
subject must play an internal role in subjective reflection. This internal role is either
identical to or very closely resembles inwardness.
The passion of the infinite is very closely related to inwardness. At one point,
Kierkegaard describes them as “the infinite passion of inwardness” (Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, 317). This suggests that the internal role of the subject in
subjective reflection is held in an infinitely passionate manner, such that subjective
reflection specifically sparks intense passion in the subject. Kierkegaard’s meaning of
infinite passion corresponds to the subjective truth becoming a paradox, and a forgetting
of this paradox, whereby the subject transcends its own being, much like Abraham.
Infinite passion is subjective truth becoming a paradox and then forgetting it.
The paradox is subjective truth and how it contains objective truth but is not
identical with it. If subjective truth is found by reflecting on the relationship between
subject and object, but is not objective truth which does reflect on the object, Subjective
truth either cannot reflect on anything but itself, in which it becomes it’s own object
(nodding to Fichte), or both can and cannot reflect on an object. Either way, Subjective
reflection is a paradox. The former way is more on par with Kierkegaard’s talk of
forgetting and becoming. Moreover, the paradox becomes in a Hegelian sense. It is a
synthesis. The synthesis is atemporal, and strictly metaphysical.
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In this way, in subjective reflection, subject and object are not different from one
another. This aligns with his talk of the I transcending the I—this occurs in subjective
reflection (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 315). The I must be outside itself in order
for it to see itself. The subject is outside the object but both are the I. What passion it
must be, to be all that you are, and more that you are, all at once. What a culmination it
must be, what an experience it must be, where subjectivity is of object and subject, of the
whole picture, of the truth.
What a mystic experience it must be. Subjective reflection is the mystic
experience. The transcendence of the I must be this. The dissolution of distinction
characteristic of the mystic experience is the subject outside the object but identical to the
object. The subject sees itself as an object. The distinction between subject and object
dissolves, and is simultaneously revealed. It is forgotten and realized at the same time. It
becomes and ceases to exist in the same instant.
At this point it has been made clear that knowing and not knowing have a special
relationship. Knowing, i.e., in the way in which we are ordinarily conscious, in the way
in which we analyze, use reasons, words, the intellect and the like, is not the way of
enlightenment, of true, unillusive knowledge, of self-knowledge, and of God knowledge.
This type of knowing is actually not knowing. Likewise, not knowing, as in the principles
of ineffability, nothingness, indistinct being and the like—deconstructions of the former
type of knowledge—are indeed the way of truth, the realization and awakening of the
Absolute, of Being. There are several ways of conveying or expressing this latter type of
knowledge, and up to this point, an adequate amount has been put on display. But
perhaps the most accurate reflection of this mode of knowledge of Being is Vedanta.
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Vedanta’s esoteric attire in no way flaunts a suit at a dinner party, nor shames its exoteric
counterpart, worship-based and culture-structured religion. Vedanta hones a neutral
energy, and yet, the energy it hones can be understood no better than as an energy of
mystery.
Revelation, an alternative or part of familiarization, has no revealer, which is a
misnomer, and is authorless (The Essential Vedanta, 3). A revelation without a revealer is
just as much a conundrum as Western religions’ characterizations of God, but unlike
these exotericisms, Vedanta includes an undertone of clarity rather than leaving us with
confusion and confusion alone. The stroke of clarity is most easily understood in it being
described as a misnomer. It strikingly resembles ineffability, or to be just as accurate, an
issue of effability. Misnomers can either can traced to Babel or taken to be an element of
revelation. In the Old Testament, God created with the word (God said “Let there be
light”, and there was light). But the authorless aspect of revelation implies no Creator,
and no words needed to create. An author is useless without his pen, and only a pen can
produce words. Metaphorically, this gets the point across. The misnomer aspect of
revelation is one of silence—it is contrary to exoteric doctrine, for it understands that in
its ineffability there is no language used, there is no ordinarily conscious way of
articulating God. God is understood as mystery still and always, and God is understood as
such. Truly, revelation is still concealment, and perhaps this is the true misnomer.
Recollection, an extension and indoctrination of revelation, is yet another
paradox. To indoctrinate without authoring, to give name to the unspoken, to reveal the
revelation but ultimately conceal it and at once create illusions of grander: the stories of
the Faces, stories of war; they are all cyphers, expressions of the inexpressible, the literal
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meaning of which sporadically reflects the Unseen but in their totality are pure illusion.
The Bhagavadgita, a story of relating to Hindu faces is nothing other than a story of such
cyphering. There is no word to describe it other than a cryptic one, no story other than an
equally horrid, equally beautiful one, etc. To be cryptic is to be clear.
Moreover, recollection documents stories of good and evil, of waging war against
desire, of evil emerging from untouchable excellence (The Essential Vedanta, 64).
Symbolically, this tension is no less a tension than the tension in Western religions, and
so here Vedanta’s separation from exotericisms does fall short. But these very tensions
are no less tensions than the tension of language rising out of the ineffable. The
paradoxical structure undergoes a metamorphosis, from the abstract wordless to the word,
to the evil emerging from good. The tension evolves into something more easily grasped,
however less reflective of Truth it becomes, continuously. Oddly, this is what Vedanta
proclaims in the literalness of its stories: departures, diasporas away from the indistinct
untouched All. This synchronicity of literalness and pattern is no mistake, but rather a
confirmation.
Recent talk of illusion is best conveyed in Vedanta by maya (The Essential
Vedanta, 66). Maya means illusion, and it is the way in which Brahman is revealed to us.
To experience Brahman full force would be overwhelming, and so maya, the element of
illusion and manifest Brahman made apparent to us, is what is offered. But the
overwhelming aspect of Brahman presumes there is someone to be overwhelmed. In the
mystic experience, being overwhelmed is not a concern, mainly because that which
overwhelms a self, a self unites with. Literally, one becomes overwhelment and is thus
not overwhelmed. This contrast then makes it clear that Vedanta is taking Brahman to be
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something one cannot join, at least with regard to maya, for in truth one already is
Brahman. In other words, one’s experience is or would not be as vivid as the mystic
experience, a kind of sedation and tolerability also found in familiarization. It would be
perhaps superficial; Arjuna knows this all too well (The Essential Vedanta, 72).
Compared to the mystic experience, it is in this way that Vedanta and familiarization are
close—they bask in the brightest light but do not blind any vision.
Perhaps the component of Vedanta most relevant to the mystery of God and the
latter stages of familiarization is the nonduality of Atman and Brahman. Atman is the
principle of individuation, the maker of multiplicity and differentiation. All that is finite
is the work of Atman. Concepts are finite because of Atman. The self is separate from the
rest of Being, and Being is not one but rather several because of Atman. Atman is the
very crux of illusion. Atman is manifestation. Atman as Being is the ordinary physical
world we commonly know.
Brahman is not the same, but it is not different. Brahman is the All, the indistinct,
the precursor and nullifier of multiplicity. Brahman is nothingness. It is ungraspable,
unmanifest and ordinarily unknowable, but by means of familiarization, knowable still.
The opposite of Atàman, Brahman may be the content of the mystic experience, where
Atman becomes Brahman, as it would seem to begin with. The realization is that Atman
is Brahman, that the illusion is no different than that which it conceals. Atman is another
representation of that which is Brahman. The illusion of distinction and multiplicity in
this case is not one of falsehood but one of truth.
Sachchidananda is not different from and is an indicator of Brahman (The Life
Divine, 113). It is a compound word composed of three elements: being, mind or
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consciousness, and bliss. In this way, being and mind are merely elements partaking in
the same entity. The entity is positive and substantive, but it oddly has the element of
being unbound or being without concrete form. It is without distinction but not exactly
equivalent to nothingness. In the mystic experience, the entire experience is a mental
event, but it is also metaphysical since one’s consciousness and selfhood joins with and
dissolves into the Absolute. The mystic experience shares this mind-being dichotomy
with Brahman as sachchidananda.
As far as the bliss aspect of it, it does not exactly fall into the characterization of
Vedanta having neutral energy. However, it is important to note that it would be
wonderful if the undertone of Being was bliss and not neutrality, but perhaps
overwhelming as well, a feeling that has already been addressed. Moreover, the
dichotomy of good and bad, or the existence of a tension, seems to be deconstructed with
the element of bliss, since there is no pain. This does two things. Firstly, it doesn’t allow
for any minimization of accuracy as tensions would evolve because there is none to begin
with. Second, it changes the measure of accuracy from a tension to a single pillar, i.e.
bliss. Often energy that is not neutral is held between two extremes in tension. Since
there is no opposite of bliss to create such a dynamic, this is how Vedanta is neutral. The
bliss element of sachchidananda is a monoelement, and it shows how Brahman is neutral.
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THEMES
From all that has been written so far, two central themes emerge. First, God’s
omni-nature is reminiscent in both the rational more exoteric perspective and the
mystically experiential perspective; they merely reform themselves in the latter case as
distinguishable via juxtaposition with the dissolution of distinctness. Second, as far as the
languages of understanding God goes, whether they be rational or mystically experiential,
any sense contained within them turns out to be nonsense, and reversibly and equally
true, any nonsense within them turns out to be sense. Expanding upon this, it should be
seen how the entire process of understanding God is infinitely mysterious, literally.
The discussion of themes begins with the omni-qualification of God. Clearly it
was explained in the means of reason section of this paper how God’s attributes of
goodness, power, knowledge and presence are omni-qualified. Though God has many
attributes, many of them are omni-qualified, which is to say that the very omniqualification of God is mere central to the nature of God than say the mere all-goodness
of God. Moreover, if the attributes were not omni-qualified (take for example God being
powerful but not all-powerful, and still all good), the problems which arise from them
would no longer exist. It is the omni-qualification itself then that is most central to God,
and it is responsible for the high degree of contradiction within exoteric religion. This is
how important the omni-qualification of God is.
By looking at the element of the dissolution of distinctness within the mystic
experience, one sees how God is experienced as a being without any distinction. The
omni-qualifications of God clearly are distinct from one another. However, to see them as
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indistinct would still be to see them and God as omni-regarded, just not benevolentregarded for example. This is much like how one sees God as indistinct in the mystic
experience as nothing-everything being, but in this case more of an everything or allomni being. The parallel here then is God as all as seen through God’s omni-qualification
in exoteric religion and God as an everything being in the mystic experience.
The discussion of themes continues with the dynamic of sense and nonsense.
From the rational and exoteric point of view, the concept of God, given all of its parts, is
self-contradictory in a plethora of ways. Yet these contradictions are taken as truth within
the given conditions of certain exoteric religions; i.e., nonsense is held to a standard of
high truth and sense. In other words, within the exoteric method, this structure, however
irrational it may be, signifies truth within and for its domain. Moreover, the mystic
experience is one where one is unaware of a state which is claimed to be real; the degree
of experiential nonsense in this case is equally if not more insensible as the one in the
exoteric traditions; yet it too, is taken to be a form of truth and sense. Thus, in both the
exoteric and esoteric traditions, this element of nonsense, confusion and mystery has been
concluded to be a pattern, if not a backdrop for their bases and structures.
The discussion of themes nears its end with an extension of the former paragraph.
Clearly it can be noticed that the dynamic of sense and nonsense as described prior is
itself insensible, at least from a rational point of view. Likewise, to understand God from
a rational point of view simultaneous with a mystical point of view seems mentally
impossible, at least from a rational point of view and not a mystical one; from a mystical
point of view, it is allowed. Of course, the subject and instrument of one’s analysis are
the same and as such without any other tool of discernment one is unable to escape
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redundancy (which, by the way, is circular yet only unacceptable from a rational point of
view). One gains nothing new and is back to where one started. This structure seems to
try to build upon itself, all the while being virtually static. No new information is gained
yet the meta-structure grows infinitely. This mental state in understanding God is like a
spiral staircase which, though it seems to reach toward the sky, only starts and ends in the
same place. To understand God as infinite is to in this case realize how the method of
understanding God is infinite and spiral. Perhaps one’s mind courses through the spiral
trying to find God, all the while God is in the center of it, untouchable. Or perhaps God is
the staircase, and familiarization is climbing the steps.
The process of understanding God is then one that is infinite and mysterious. It is
on a final note for this thesis important to declare that the omni-nature of God and the
infinite nature of God are related in their limitlessness, for the all is unlimited in its
inclusion of all that is and unlimited even in its own nature; one would intuitively say that
the only thing the all cannot be is nothing—but, as one should recall, the all is nothing
too; and the infinity of God is unlimited in its lack of end. That, and to say that God is a
mystery is not to imply that the mystery is one to be solved; rather, to say that God is a
mystery is indeed the very revelation of the form of God.
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